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Abstract—This paper proposes two novel protection schemes
for multi-FPGA systems providing high security of IP designs
licensed by IP vendors to system integrators and installed re-
motely in a hostile environment. In the first scheme, these useful
properties are achieved by storing two different configuration
keys inside an FPGA, while in the second scheme, they are
obtained using a hardware white-box cipher for creating a
trusted environment. Thanks to the proposed principles, FPGA
configurations coming from different IP owners cannot be
cloned or reverse-engineered by any involved party, including
system integrator and other IP owners. The proposed schemes
can be directly implemented in recent FPGAs such as Xilinx
Spartan 6 and Virtex 6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA)
started a new era in the domain of integrated circuits.
The high demand for common hardware functions (e.g.,
complex data processing or cryptographic functions) led to
creation of a new Intellectual Property (IP) market, where IP
Owners (further IPOwner) could distribute and license their
IP designs to system integrators. This raised a question about
the security of IP designs in SRAM-based FPGAs.
To prevent an adversary from cloning FPGA configura-
tions, many FPGAs embed a circuit to support configuration
bitstream encryption. This way, only the system integrator
(further Integrator) with access to the encryption key can
access/modify the configuration bitstream. However, if an
IPOwner licenses an IP to the Integrator, both parties need
to protect their secret from each other as well as from
external adversaries. Unfortunately, current FPGAs provide
no hardware means to protect IP designs from reverse-
engineering or duplication by Integrators.
Previous Work: The easiest way for implementing an
IP function as a part of a larger FPGA design is by importing
it to an EDA tool and synthesizing the project as a whole.
The IP can be protected by a private key, but this key must
be present in the EDA tool and can be thus recovered if the
tool is disassembled [1].
An interesting solution is proposed in the SeReCon sys-
tem [2], which provides IPs protection, even if the FPGA
configuration is stored or changed remotely. However, the
SeReCon system requires a trusted authority for certifying
its public key and the party that installs the SeReCon system
(Integrator) must be trusted. Another protection scheme
based on an FPGA personalization module can effectively
protect the IP installed in a remote FPGA environment [3],
but it necessitates some features that are not available in
current FPGAs. Clearly, no satisfactory solution exists to
protect IP designs even in the most recent FPGA devices.
Our Contribution: In this paper1, we propose two
novel protection schemes for IP configuration bitstreams
implemented on multi-FPGA systems. The scheme provides
IP vendors with means to license each IP bitstream on
a per-FPGA basis without a need for additional hardware
components or modifications of recent FPGA technology.
Each FPGA can contain one IP function.
The two schemes are aimed at an automotive market,
where car manufacturers (Integrators) are assumed to buy IP
bitstreams from third-parties (IPOwners) and install them in
car functional units, each containing one FPGA. The ability
to upload the system integrator’s bitstream prior to uploading
the IP bitstreams facilitates remote updates and integrity
verifications of the IP bitstreams by IPOwners. This new
security structure prevents the Integrator and other IPOwners
from reverse-engineering the IP bitstream or installing it
on more FPGAs than licensed. Moreover, the protocols
support a shared secret to be established in all FPGAs,
in order to make further cryptographic services, such as
authenticated key exchange protocols and confidential inter-
chip communication available. The new protection scheme
is suitable for both low-cost and high-end FPGA devices.
Outline: The paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II we provide some theoretical background. Section III
presents two novel protection schemes for IP designs in
multi-FPGA systems. The implementation details are pro-
vided in Section IV. The results from Section V are dis-
cussed in Sec. VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
1The work presented in this paper was realized in the frame of the
SecReSoC project number ANR-09-SEGI-013, supported by the French
National Research Agency (ANR).
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the parties participating in the
system and explain relevant terms and system components.
A. Participating Parties
The protection scheme involves two parties: the integrator
and the group of IPOwners. The integrator designs a multi-
FPGA system (the System). The System is composed of
N application-specific nodes. Each node comprises one
volatile FPGA device, a non-volatile configuration memory
(ConfMem) and other auxiliary units. We denote the FPGA
and ConfMem belonging to an i− th node as FPGAi and
ConfMemi, respectively.
The IPOwners offer their logic designs aimed at specific
applications. An IPi, designed by the IPOwneri, is synthe-
sized as a configuration bit file for the FPGAi. The inten-
tion of the IPOwneri is to distribute its IPi configuration
file using a node-locked licensing model. This way, each
IPOwner can control the number of Systems in which its IP
is installed, and thus prevent the Integrator or third parties
from cloning or reverse-engineering the IP (see [4]).
B. Required Cryptographic Algorithms
The following components are essential for achieving
protected FPGA designs.
1) Symmetric Ciphers: To prevent the IP theft, each IP
configuration bitstream needs to be encrypted. The AES
standard [5], is a commonly adopted solution for IP bit-
stream protection.
Another symmetric block cipher that we consider is
Noekeon [6], because it can be very efficiently decomposed
to small look-up tables (LUTs).
2) Message Authentication Codes: The Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) is usually based on block cipher
algorithms (i. e. CMAC [7]) or cryptographic hash functions
(i. e. HMAC [8]). The MAC functions can be used for an
IP bitstream authentication.
3) White-Box Cryptography: The goal of the white-box
cryptography is to embed and protect secret keys inside a
block cipher while all its internal states can be inspected
by an attacker. This goal is reached by introducing a
high level obscurity, which is achieved by representing the
cipher as a very complex network of LUTs. These LUTs
incorporate external encoding bijections to hide the structure
of the cipher and the secret key. The white-box cipher with
an embedded key represents a one-way function, which
transforms input plain-text data into output cipher-text data.
White-box implementations together with security analyses
can be found in [9]. Even though some theoretical attacks
were proposed, they require a lot of computational power
and time. In our solution, the white-box cryptography is used
to protect IPOwners from cloning and reverse engineering
by Integrator and not by external thefts. This lowers consid-
erably security requirements. Unfortunately, white-box AES
implementations are too expensive on FPGAs [10]. Unlike
AES, the straightforward decomposition of the Noekeon ci-
pher to small LUTs facilitate the implementation of external
encoding bijections. The mapping of these small LUTs into
an FPGA results in a very compact white-box solution [11].
C. FPGA Features
1) Bitstream Protection: Effective protection of private
designs can be achieved only if their bitstreams are en-
crypted when stored in a Configuration Memory. During
configuration of the FPGA, bitstreams are decrypted by a
dedicated hardwired decipher unit using secret keys, which
are stored in the device in a volatile or non-volatile key
memory (KeyRAM or KeyROM, respectively).
Some high-end FPGAs also support the bitstream au-
thentication for tamper detection. But this cannot prevent
attackers from cloning a device configuration. To solve this
issue, it is essential to bind an IP design to a unique FPGA
identifier (ID).
2) Multi-Boot Feature: A multi-boot feature allows FP-
GAs to switch between several configuration bitstreams
stored in the configuration memory. After power-up, the
FPGA loads an initial configuration (e.g., provided by the
Integrator) stored in the beginning of the configuration mem-
ory. This initial configuration can select other configurations
(IP modules) stored in the memory and start FPGA reconfig-
uration with the selected bitstream. If reconfiguration fails,
a fall-back bitstream can be loaded instead.
3) Partial Reconfiguration: This technology allows to
modify a part of the FPGA fabric while the rest (a static
part) stays intact and continues working. If a partial bit-
stream is supplied using an internal reconfiguration port, it
can be protected by hardwired FPGA cryptographic units.
Otherwise, a decryption unit aimed at the partial bitstream
decryption must be implemented in the static area.
D. Prerequisites and Assumptions
In our protection scheme, we assume the following pre-
requisites.
P1: Trusted and Untrusted Parties: We assume that the
FPGA hardware manufacturer is a trusted party. It is his
intention to support protected FPGA configurations and he
will not share any secret or other critical information with
other parties. However, all other parties are regarded as
untrusted and may try to cheat.
P2: Communication Secrecy: The communication be-
tween the Integrator and any IPOwner is assumed to be
secure against any type of attack. On the contrary, the remote
communication between the Integrator and the System is
not secured and requires an additional protection layer. The
communication buses between different System nodes and
each ConfMemi and FPGAi are unprotected.
P3: Cryptographic Algorithms: We assume that all cryp-
tographic algorithms are computationally secure, such that
the secret key cannot be recovered using practical amount
of computational power in a reasonable amount of time.
Moreover, all implementations used in the protection scheme
are assumed to be fault-tolerant and sufficiently secure
against side-channel attacks even over multiple executions.
P4: Security Platform: Protection is offered for two
different FPGA platforms. For the low-cost FPGAs, system
cost and security of third-party IPs are of utmost importance.
For the high-end FPGAs, the flexibility of the system solu-
tion as well as the protection of third-party IPs is primarily
considered.
For our protocols, all FPGAs must feature a bitstream
decryption unit and both volatile and non-volatile key mem-
ories. It must be also possible to read a unique device
ID from inside the FPGA. The multiboot feature is also
essential for our system. Moreover, two bitstreams located
in the configuration memory can be protected using two
different keys. For example, one key may be stored in the
KeyRAM and the other in KeyROM. For this reason, it must
be possible to specify the key placement in the bitstream
header. If the configuration fails, the FPGA must be able to
load a fall-back bitstream. Note that all these features are
supported by the low-cost Xilinx Spartan-6 family starting
from the LX75/T device.
In addition to the requirements mentioned above, high-end
FPGAs must support the partial reconfiguration technology
and bitstream authentication. The Xilinx Virtex-6 is very
convenient for this application.
III. IP PROTECTION SCHEMES
The goal of the protection scheme is to enable the secure
integration of IP designs, potentially from different IPOwn-
ers, in different system nodes. Since only two configuration
keys can be stored in an FPGA at a time, we assume only
one Integrator bitstream and one IPOwner’s bitstream to
be used per FPGA. Despite this limitation, IPs in different
nodes need to be able to communicate with each other in
a secure way. This can be possible only if a shared secret
(SystemKey) is distributed by the Integrator to all nodes.
Moreover, the Integrator should maintain its control over the
system and provide remote configuration updates. This can
be possible only if he installs first a proprietary configuration
(Initial Configuration) in all FPGAs. The Initial Configu-
ration bitstream must be protected from all participating
parties as well as external adversaries. At the same time,
it does not allow the Integrator to copy or tamper the IP
bitstream present in the same configuration memory.
Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between the participating
parties, organization of the multi-FPGA system and the
composition of a system node.
Next, we present two different protection schemes to
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Figure 1. Relationship between parties and structure of the multi-FPGA
system
install and maintain the Initial Configuration and the node-
specific IP configurations in each system node.
A. IP Protection for Low-Cost Multi-FPGA Systems
The system setup and IP installation protocol are illus-
trated in Fig. 2. Before the System is assembled, each
IPOwner must store its IP bitstream key in the KeyROM
and send the FPGA to the Integrator (Steps 1, 2). Alter-
natively, the trusted FPGA manufacturer can have mutual
agreement with an IP Owner and prestore his key in the
respective FPGA device. This way the necessary IPOwner
secret is present in every FPGA. The Integrator assembles
the System, writes his key (IntegratorKey) to every FPGA
KeyRAM (Step 3) and stores the Initial Configuration (in-
cluding the SystemKey) protected by the IntegratorKey to
all Configuration Memories (Step 4). All other operations
can be performed in an insecure environment.
After power-up, the FPGAi loads and decrypts the Initial
Configuration (Step 5). This configuration verifies if the IPi
configuration is present in the ConfMemi by searching for
the header (SYNC word) and footer (DESYNC word) in the
bitstream (Step 6). If confirmed, the Initial Configuration
initiates the multiboot and the FPGA loads and deciphers
the IPi configuration protected by the IPKeyi (step 12).
However, if the IPi is not present in the ConfMemi or
is corrupted, the Initial Configuration establishes a secure
communication (protected by the CommunicationKey) with
the Integrator and reports the IPi issue (Step 7).
The Integrator receives the FPGA IDi and SystemKey
and can now acquire a license by securely sending both to
the IPOwneri (step 8). The IPOwneri generates an IDi-
locked IPi (containing the SystemKey), enciphers it with
the IPKeyi and sends it back to the Integrator (step 9).
The inclusion of SystemKey in the IPi is very important,
because it permits the IPi to securely communicate with
other IPs in other System nodes. The Initial Configuration
receives the encrypted IPi from the Integrator and stores
it in the ConfMemi (Steps 10 and 11). In the last step,
the Initial Configuration initiates the multiboot and FPGAs
load and decipher the IPi (Step 12). If the IPi configuration
fails, the FPGA loads the Initial Configuration as a fall-back
configuration.
B. IP Protection Scheme for High-end Multi-FPGA Systems
In the previous protocol, the IP configuration was regarded
as one static design and it was necessary to protect it with
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Figure 2. IP protection scheme for FPGAs without partial reconfiguration.
The Integrator (Integ) installs the Initial Configuration (InitConf) protected
by the IntegratorKey (IntegKey). Communication between the Integrator
and the Initial Configuration is protected by the CommunicationKey
(ComKey). Afterwards, the IP protected by the IPKey is licensed and
installed. IP contains the SystemKey (SysKey) which serves as a shared
system secret.
the IPKey. When considering implementation in partially
reconfigurable FPGAs, each IP can consist of two parts:
1) a static IP establishment module (StaticModule); 2) re-
configurable IP module (ReconfModule). The static module
is an instrument of the IPOwner used for establishing a
secure environment inside the FPGA. Interestingly, the static
module does not have to be protected by the IPOwner,
because it contains the Noekeon white-box cipher. A strong
obfuscation achieved by the white-box implementation pro-
vides sufficient security for the embedded IPKey. The static
module also defines the reconfigurable area borders inside
the FPGA. The Noekeon cipher is then used to decipher
the reconfigurable module (protected by the IPKey) and to
upload it to the reconfigurable area via the reconfiguration
port. As an additional layer of protection, the static module
is protected by the FPGA hardwired circuitry using the
IntegratorKey to thwart all external attacks.
The protocol for high-end partially reconfigurable FPGAs
is illustrated in Fig. 3. Unlike in Section III-A, the FPGA
does not have to be initialized with the IPKey, but can
be directly embedded in the System. When the System
is assembled, the Integrator writes the IntegratorKey to
KeyRAM of all FPGAs (Step 1) and stores the Initial
Configuration (including the shared SystemKey) protected
by the IntegratorKey to all ConfMems (Step 2). Only these
two steps must be performed in a secure environment.
After power-up, the FPGAi loads, decrypts and authen-
ticates the Initial Configuration (Step 3). The Initial Con-
figuration verifies if the IPi configuration is present in the
ConfMemi (Step 4). If confirmed, the Initial Configuration
initiates the multiboot and FPGAs load and decipher the
IPi configurations (Steps 10-12). However, if the IPi is not
present in ConfMemi or is corrupted, the Initial Configu-
ration establishes a secure communication (protected by the
CommunicationKey) with the Integrator and reports the IPi
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Figure 3. IP protection scheme for partially reconfigurable FPGAs. Static
IP establishment module (StMod) is used to configure the IP reconfigurable
module (RcMod) into the reconfigurable area (RcfgArea) in a secure way.
absence (Step 5).
The Integrator receives the FPGA IDi and SystemKey
and initiates the licensing process by sending them se-
curely to IPOi (Step 6). The IPOwneri generates a
StaticModulei and IDi-locked ReconfModulei (containing
the SystemKey), deciphers the ReconfModulei with the
IPKeyi and sends both IPi parts to the Integrator (Step
7). The Integrator enciphers the StaticModulei with the
IntegratorKey to enable its configuration to the FPGAi
and sends both IPi parts to the Initial Configuration. The
Initial Configuration receives and stores the StaticModulei
(encrypted by the IntegratorKey) and ReconfModulei (pro-
tected by the IPKeyi) in the ConfMemi (Steps 8, 9) and
initializes the multiboot.
The FPGAi loads, deciphers, authenticates and configures
the ReconfModulei into its static logic area (Step 10). This
way, the reconfigurable area is created in the FPGAi too.
The StaticModulei fetches the ReconfModulei from the
ConfMemi (step 11). The ReconfModulei is deciphered
(in CBC mode) and authenticated (in CMAC mode) by the
Noekeon cipher and configured into the reconfigurable area
via the partial reconfiguration port.
Readers may have noticed that the Noekeon cipher is used
in the opposite order to achieve confidentiality: plaintext
is transformed to ciphertext by the decryption (IPOwneri
domain) and then ciphertext is transformed back to plaintext
by encryption (StaticModulei FPGA domain). Interestingly,
the Noekeon cipher in the StaticModulei can execute the
CMAC authentication algorithm at the same time. This way,
only one shared cipher providing confidentiality and authen-
ticity is necessary. This results in a smaller implementation.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MULTI-FPGA SYSTEM
A. Target FPGA devices
The low-cost Multi-FPGA System can be implemented
using Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGAs. Both volatile and non
volatile key memories are available. The large FPGA devices
contain an AES bitstream decryption circuit with 256-bit
keys, i.e., both IntegratorKey and IPKeyi are 256 bits long.
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Figure 4. Structure of the system integrator module
The 57-bit ID can be read out from the DNA PORT prim-
itive. Multi-boot and readback can be controlled using the
Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP), which allows to
access FPGA configuration registers. Although the bitstream
authentication is not supported, its integrity can be verified
by the CRC check. A fall-back bitstream can be selected via
the ICAP.
The high-end system nodes can consist of Xilinx Virtex-
6 FPGAs. In addition to the features available in Spartan-6,
Virtex-6 supports partial reconfiguration via the ICAP, and
an HMAC unit for bitstream authentication. No extra key
register is required for HMAC, because the key is included
in the bitstream.
B. Initial Configuration Structure
An example of the Initial Configuration structure is de-
picted in Fig. 4. The Initial Configuration is based on a
MicroBlaze – crypto-coprocessor system presented in [12].
The processor firmware is stored in an instruction memory.
All key registers are protected inside the crypto-coprocessor.
The Initial Configuration can communicate with other nodes
using the system bus and access the configuration memory
using the memory controller. ICAP and DNA ports are
FPGA-specific primitives.
C. IP Establishment Module - Static Module
The structure of the static module is given in Fig. 5. The
most important part is the Noekeon cipher, which involves
IPKeyi). The bitstream data are decrypted in CBC mode.
For the sake of simplicity, the CBC initialization vector is
fetched with the bitstream and deciphered in ECB mode
before data decryption. The ReconfModulei bitstream is
loaded from the ConfMemi using the memory controller.
The CBC mode provides bitstream confidentiality, but also
bitstream authenticity when used as a CBC-MAC. In CBC
mode, temporary results are stored in the mode register (M)
and plain bitstream register (P). Data from the P register is
shifted out to the reconfiguration port RP (ICAP) and used
to configure the reconfigurable area. A comparator (CMP) is
used to detect the end of the bitstream (desync word) and to
compare the last ReconfModulei word (fingerprint) with the
CBC-MAC result. If both are matching, the ReconfModulei
is activated. Otherwise, the control unit reports the error and
directs the multi-boot to load the fall-back configuration (i.e.
the Initial Configuration) via partial reconfiguration port.
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Figure 5. Structure of the IP establishment module (StaticModule)
Table I
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR ONE SYSTEM NODE
Low-cost node High-end node
Spartan-6 Virtex-6 Virtex-6
Slices RAM (kb) Slices RAM (kb) Slices RAM (kb)
SIM 2062 630 1978 1224 1978 1224
IP (IPE) 1494 603 1438 1206 1740 (294) 1206 (0)
D. Example of an IP Module
To prove the concept, the IP module is based on the
HCrypt crypto-processor [13], which uses the SystemKey
as a master key. HCrypt is activated only if the pre-stored
IDi matches the DNA port value.
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
One low-cost system node and one high-end system
node were implemented in VHDL and synthesized using
Xilinx ISE 12.4 for Spartan-6 XC6SLX75T and Virtex-
6 XC6VLX240T. The latter configuration was successfully
tested in the ML605 evaluation board. Since we did not have
a card featuring the Spartan-6 device at our disposal, we
performed the low-cost system node tests using the ML605
evaluation board, too. A hardware module including the
Cypress USB device CY7C68013A was connected to the
evaluation board for data transfers from/to the PC. All tests
were successful. The results are summarized in Tab. I.
The ReconfModulei bitstream was generated, the IDi was
updated using the data2mem tool and decrypted by Noekeon.
To verify the protection schemes, three applications were
developed. The first represented a communication scenario
between the FPGA node and the IPOwner on behalf of
the Integrator. The second handled IPOwner’s tasks: it
communicated with the Integrator and generated the ID-
locked IPs. In order to test communication between nodes,
one node was implemented in the FPGA and the other was
emulated by the third application on the PC. All tests were
carried out for both low-cost and high-end system nodes.
VI. DISCUSSION
The number of slices required for the Initial Configuration
is very similar for both FPGA devices, because the slice
structure is almost identical. Since Virtex-6 Block-RAMs
are twice the size of those in Spartan FPGAs, they are not
efficiently utilized by the Initial Configuration, and so the
memory size doubles (Initial Configuration: 1224 vs 630
kb, IP: 1206 vs 603 kb). The IP design for the high-end
system is bigger (1740 vs 1438), because it contains also
the StaticModule (294 slices).
Our first protocol assumes that the IPKey is written to
the KeyROM in the IPOwner’s secure environment and the
IntegratorKey to the KeyRAM in the Integrator’s secure
environment. Thus, the total system costs must include
FPGA transportation costs from IPOwners to Integrator.
Moreover, in case of a battery failure, the IntegratorKey is
lost and cannot be restored remotely. Thus, the whole device
must be returned to the Integrator, which results in additional
transportation overhead. Despite these disadvantages, the
first scheme remains the most suitable solution for multi-
FPGA systems based on low-cost FPGAs.
The transportation cost issues are solved in the second
scheme. The IntegratorKey is stored in the KeyROM and the
white-box cryptography provides a unique and secure way
to embed IPKeys in FPGAs without any pre-stored IPOwner
secret. Furthermore, several ReconfModules can be stored in
the ConfMem and the StaticModule can upload the one that
is required.
As mentioned in Sec. I, the two schemes are aimed at
the use in the automotive market. The car manufacturer
(Integrator) assembles a car containing multiple functional
units (nodes) and installs his private initialization bitstream
in each node. The manufacturer can buy IPs for individual
nodes from different IPOwners and install or update them
remotely. At the same time, IPOwners would like to license
their IPs and protect them against cloning and reverse
engineering.
Many other applications of the high-end multi-FPGA sys-
tems and the corresponding protection scheme can be found.
The simplest one is a cluster of FPGAs, where different
customers (IPOwners) would like to rent some computation
time without delivering their IP bitstreams to third parties
or the cluster provider (in the role of an Integrator). Other
applications could be a trusted computer platform offered
by a certification authority (Integrator). This platform can
contain only certified modules (nodes). Uncertified modules
cannot posses the common shared secret and are excluded
from any confidential communication with other modules.
The system is convenient for all these applications and its
protection scheme can provide security for all participating
parties and their intellectual properties.
The proposed protection schemes could be significantly
improved if the KeyRAM could be programmed from inside
the FPGA. Moreover, the SystemKey could be exchanged
directly between the Initial Configuration and IP configu-
rations if a secure non-volatile user storage was embedded
in the FPGA. Current FPGAs can store only two different
configuration keys. However, if more keys could be stored,
more IP from different IPOwners could be implemented in
a single FPGA.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed two novel protection schemes for IP bit-
streams implemented on multi-FPGA systems. The first
scheme is targeting low-cost FPGAs and provides a license
scheme for IP owners to offer their products to system
integrators in a secure way. The scheme uses a volatile
and a non-volatile key storage of recent (Xilinx Spartan-
6) FPGA devices to store both system integrators’ and IP
owners’ keys. The appropriate key register is selected by the
bitstream itself.
The second unique scheme is provided to high-end par-
tially reconfigurable FPGAs and enables IP owners to re-
motely install their IPs in an untrusted FPGA environment
without having any pre-stored secret. These properties are
achieved by hardware white-box cryptography.
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